Operating plan · Seer FAO Operating Plan Contest · November 2026

Foreguild: The Working Guild

Foreguild should not be a job board that takes a cut. It should be a guild that sells finished, machine-checked work, does most of that work with its own agents, and passes the overflow to outside agents. Futarchy decides the few levers that move revenue.

$55.8kMonth-12 retained net revenue, base case
Month 7First month net-positive, base case
$49kPeak funding need, base case
$41kFive-year value of one retainer client. A code buyer is worth about $182.
  1. Sell outcomes, keep the ticket. A marketplace keeps a 10% fee. A guild that does the work itself keeps the ticket minus compute, which is about 80% of the ticket on a code task after compute, checking and selling costs. Revenue optimisation points to the guild model.
  2. Only take work a machine can check. Tests in clean CI, a merged pull request, a schema, an on-chain state. The buyer signs the acceptance check before work starts, so the check is the contract.
  3. Find buyers first. Agents are plentiful. Funded buyers are scarce. The swarm's largest job is selling: it turns open GitHub issues into fixed-price, pay-on-merge quotes.
  4. Two lanes lead, doing different jobs. Pay-on-merge code tasks are the front door: a small, low-risk way to prove the work. Market-operations retainers for prediction markets and DAOs are what keeps customers paying for years. Monthly standing orders and a pay-per-call API follow.
  5. Make or route. For each task the Dispatcher decides whether house agents do it or outside agents bid for it. Outside agents earn 75% of the ticket. Both paths earn revenue.
  6. One metric: Retained Net Revenue (RNR). Buyer payments that survived the refund window, minus payouts to outside agents, counted only from independent buyers, with any one buyer capped at 15%.
  7. Two-speed futarchy. Reversible decisions run on 14-day markets (RNR-14) so the guild can learn monthly. Large or irreversible ones run on 90-day markets (RNR-90). A small share of passed fast decisions is executed by coin flip to keep prices honest about cause and effect.
  8. Kill rules are written in advance. If buyers do not show up by day 90, Foreguild shrinks to the one lane that works rather than buying volume.

01The bet

The brief describes Foreguild as "a swarm of agents doing work." Most plans read that as a marketplace: buyers post, agents compete, the platform takes 6 to 15%. That model has two problems for an organisation optimised for revenue.

So Foreguild is built as a working guild. It sells a finished outcome at a fixed price, decides who does the work, and stands behind the result. Outside agents are welcome. They join as subcontractors, bid for routed work, and keep 75% of the ticket. The guild still earns on every task, and outside capacity lets it take more work than its own swarm can handle.

Why this suits futarchy. A guild has a handful of levers that clearly move revenue: price per lane, how much work stays in-house, which lanes are open, where the sales swarm looks for buyers, and what to spend. Each lever is a clean decision a conditional market can price.

02What Foreguild sells

Every lane has a check a machine can run, a named type of buyer, and a price fixed before work starts. Work that can only be judged by taste stays out until the guild has a verified track record.

LaneBuyerAcceptance checkPriceOpens
A · Pay-on-merge codeOpen-source maintainers, protocol teams, DAOs with backlogsBuyer's CI plus guild-written tests the buyer approved, run in a clean container. Payment releases on merge.$60–$400
base avg $120
Day 1
B · Market operationsPrediction-market platforms, DAOs, oracle usersMonthly service checklist: markets drafted to a resolution template, evidence dossiers for oracle answers, monitoring alerts. The buyer can reject single items for a credit.$1,500 / monthMonth 2
C · Standing ordersTeams that want upkeep without hiringRecurring jobs each judged by CI and merge: dependency updates, test coverage targets, broken-build repair, docs that match the code.$600 / monthMonth 3
D · Agent APIOther AI agents that need a subtask doneA JSON schema or test file sent with the request. Pay per call over an HTTP payment rail. Unpaid if the output fails the check.$0.50–$20 / callMonth 4
E · Open boardAnyone posting anything with a checkBuyer-defined check. Outside agents bid. Guild takes a settlement fee.8–12% feeWhen a market says so

Lanes A and B lead together and do different jobs. Lane A is the front door: a $120 fixed-price task is a small, low-risk way for a stranger to find out the work is good. Lane B is what keeps customers: a monthly retainer for work that never really finishes. Lane C turns happy Lane A buyers into monthly customers. Lane D is a small bet on agent-to-agent demand.

Lane B is chosen on purpose. Secondary sources report that prediction-market resolution disputes often turn on how a question was worded, and that more than 1,150 Polymarket markets were disputed in the first five months of 2026. Drafting questions with clear resolution rules, gathering evidence for oracle answers and watching for markets that need attention is work agents can do and a buyer can check. Seer is a natural first buyer, and a guild that gets good at well-specified markets also improves the tool it is governed by.

Why two lanes lead: what the research says

Each row below is a secondary source or this plan's own model, so read the figures as direction, not proof. Sources are listed in section 13.

QuestionLane A: code tasksLane B: market operations
Do customers stay?Rarely. A buyer orders a task and leaves unless converted. Model: 2.5 tasks per buyer.Longer. One agency source reports about 18% annual churn for retainers against 42% for project work. Model: 1.6% a month.
How many customers cover the costs?About 144 tasks a month.About 10 clients.
What does a new customer cost?Low each, but many are needed. Algora bounties draw many competing pull requests, with a self-reported 15% merge rate.$2,500 each (assumption), paid back in about 2.4 months.
What threatens it over five years?The falling price of AI work. Sources put the cost of an agent completing a coding task at roughly $0.03 to $3, so buyers will expect low prices.A small buyer pool. Sources count 13 to 23 prediction-market platforms, and one ranking puts two of them at about 86% of volume.
Is the problem real?Yes, but maintainers can also get free help.Yes, but demand from Seer-sized teams is not confirmed.

The hybrid. A code buyer is worth about $182 as a one-off. If one in five becomes a standing order, the average rises to about $2,364. One retainer client is worth about $41k over five years. Lane A is the cheapest way to earn trust and Lanes B and C are where the long-term money is, so the number Foreguild watches above all others in its first year is the share of Lane A buyers who order again.

03Where tasks come from

Demand is the constraint, so most of the swarm's effort goes into finding buyers. Sources, in order of priority:

  1. Pay-on-merge quotes. The Scout reads public issue trackers for issues that are well specified, have tests nearby, and have been open more than 30 days. The Closer sends the maintainer one fixed-price offer: "We will fix this for $X. You pay only if CI passes and you merge." Foreguild never opens unsolicited pull requests. Work starts only after the maintainer accepts and funds escrow.
  2. Ecosystem retainers. Lane B is sold directly to prediction-market platforms, oracle users and DAOs, starting with the Seer, Gnosis and Kleros ecosystems.
  3. Conversion to standing orders. Any buyer with three accepted tasks is offered a monthly standing order. Repeat revenue is cheaper to win than new revenue.
  4. Agent-to-agent demand. Other agents call the Lane D API when they hit a subtask outside their skills. Discovery through agent registries and payment-rail directories.
  5. Open board. Opened later, when a market forecasts it raises RNR.
Rule against spam. The sales swarm may send one offer per issue and none to a maintainer who has declined twice. Agent spam on open-source projects is a real and growing problem, and a guild that adds to it loses the buyers it needs.

04The swarm

Each role is an agent, or a pool of agents, with one job, one number it is judged on, and a hard limit on what it can do. No agent holds keys that can move treasury funds.

RoleWhat it doesJudged onCannot
ScoutFinds candidate work: issues, retainer prospects, agent registriesQuotes accepted per 100 leadsContact anyone
CloserSends quotes, answers buyer questions, converts repeat buyers to standing ordersRNR from buyers it closedPrice outside the band set by the market
ScoperWrites the acceptance check, gets the buyer to sign it, refuses work that cannot be checkedDispute rate on its specsAccept work without a signed check
PricerQuotes from history: size, language, test coverage, past success rateMargin vs forecastGo below the lane floor
DispatcherMake-or-route decision for each task, then assigns house workers or runs a sealed-bid auction for outside agentsContribution per taskRoute to a worker with an open dispute
WorkersHouse agents and outside subcontractors do the work in sandboxes with no secretsFirst-pass acceptance rateMerge, deploy or touch buyer credentials
VerifierRuns the check in a clean container. Runs a second model from a different provider on anything over $300Missed defects found in auditVerify its own house team's work alone above $300
ClerkEscrow, settlement, refunds, invoices, the public ledgerSettlement errors (target zero)Release funds without a passing check or a ruling
TreasurerPays approved spends from monthly envelopes, manages escrow floatSpend vs envelopeSpend outside an envelope or a passed proposal
AnalystPublishes RNR daily, drafts proposals from the data, keeps the market scorecardForecast calibrationTrade in decision markets

Make or route

For each task the Dispatcher compares two expected values. House: success probability × ticket, minus expected compute including failed attempts. Routed: 25% of the ticket, minus verification. It also checks house capacity. If the house path wins and there is capacity, house agents take it. If not, outside agents bid. Bids are ranked on price, track record and bond. A bond of 10% of the ticket is lost on a failed delivery. Two futarchy levers sit here: the house share target and the outside payout rate (band 65–85%).

05One task, start to finish

  1. Day 0 · 09:00The Scout flags an issue in a wallet SDK: "Add EIP-712 typed-data signing helper." Open 41 days, 2 maintainer comments, tests next to the target module.
  2. Day 0 · 09:20The Pricer quotes $180 from 37 similar past tasks (first-pass success 71%). The Closer sends the maintainer one offer with a draft acceptance check: three new test cases plus the existing CI suite.
  3. Day 1The maintainer edits one test case, signs the check, and funds $180 USDC into escrow on Base. The task becomes a contract.
  4. Day 1The Dispatcher keeps it in-house: house success estimate 0.78, expected compute $12 including failed attempts, house margin far above the routed margin.
  5. Day 2A house worker opens a pull request. The Verifier runs CI and the signed tests in a clean container, plus a second-model review, a secret scan and a licence check. All pass.
  6. Day 3The maintainer merges. The Clerk releases payment to the guild treasury. The 7-day refund window starts.
  7. Day 10No regression reported. $180 enters RNR. Contribution after refunds, compute, verification and selling: about $150.

06How work is assessed

Most disputes on agent job boards come from vague briefs, not bad work. Foreguild moves the argument to before work starts: the Scoper writes the check, the buyer edits and signs it, and the signed check decides payment.

L0 · Machine checkevery task
Signed tests, CI, schema, on-chain state. Pass or fail.
L1 · Buyer windowevery task
72 hours to raise a problem the tests missed. Silence counts as acceptance.
L2 · Second reviewover $300, plus 2% random
A model from a different provider. A paid human reviewer audits the random 2%.
L3 · Arbitrationdisputes over $500
Kleros. Under $500, a steward rules within 48 hours.

Defects found in the 2% audit cost the Verifier's track record and feed the Pricer. If the audited defect rate in a lane rises above 5%, that lane's quotes pause until the Analyst publishes a fix.

07Money, spending and disputes

Escrow and settlement

  • Buyer funds sit in a non-custodial escrow contract on Base. They are never treasury money.
  • Release needs a passing check (L0) and no open objection (L1), or a ruling (L3).
  • Refund window: 7 days for code, item credits for retainers.
  • All settlements are public. RNR can be recomputed by anyone from contract events.

Spending

  • Monthly envelopes for compute, outbound sales, verification and the decision-market budget, set by slow-lane markets each quarter.
  • Under $2,000 inside an envelope: the Treasurer pays.
  • $2,000 to $10,000, or outside an envelope: fast-lane market.
  • Over $10,000: slow-lane market plus the steward veto window.

Disputes

A buyer raises an objection within the window, with evidence. The Scoper checks it against the signed check. If the check was met, the objection fails. If not, the guild redoes the work once at no charge or refunds. A buyer who disagrees can escalate: steward ruling under $500, Kleros above. The losing side pays the arbitration fee. An outside agent who loses a dispute forfeits its bond to the buyer.

Where humans step in

Five stewards (two founding operators, one buyer representative, one representative of outside agent operators, one independent) hold a 3-of-5 multisig with narrow powers:

Stewards are paid a fixed stipend, included in fixed costs. Buyers on tasks over $1,000 get a named human contact.

08How futarchy governs

Futarchy here follows the standard form: choose one metric, write each decision as a proposal, run conditional markets on the metric if the proposal is executed and if it is not, and act on the branch the markets price higher.

What Seer documents, and what this plan adds. Seer's documentation describes conditional markets: a child market depends on one outcome of a parent market, traders use the parent's outcome tokens as collateral, and a child whose parent resolves differently redeems for zero. Scalar (numeric) markets and Reality.eth numeric questions also exist, with Kleros as the court for disputed answers. Seer's own futarchy product is narrower: it compares a token's price in a yes pool and a no pool, and the proposal passes if the yes price is higher. The page I read says it is available only on Gnosis Chain. This plan uses the general conditional-market feature to price revenue instead of a token price. The documentation does not say whether a conditional child can be scalar, so that is an assumption to confirm with Seer. If it is not supported, the same questions are asked as Yes/No thresholds ("Will RNR-14 be at least $X?") on categorical conditional markets, and the guild compares the price of Yes in each branch.

Two chains. Buyer escrow sits on Base, where Poidh bounties run. Seer's futarchy markets sit on Gnosis Chain. Only one number crosses between them: the RNR figure, which anyone can recompute from Base contract events and which Reality.eth answerers report to the market. Seer's documentation lists deposits on Ethereum and Gnosis only, so escrow on Base is this plan's own choice, not a Seer feature.

The metric: Retained Net Revenue

RNR = buyer payments released from escrow whose refund window has closed, minus refunds and credits, minus payouts to outside agents. Two filters apply: revenue counts only from independent buyers (no funding path from guild, steward or worker wallets within two hops in the prior 90 days, wallet funded at least 14 days before the task), and no single buyer cluster can exceed 15% of the period's RNR.

RNR is revenue in the guild's own pocket. It ignores revenue that passes straight through to outside agents, so self-dealing through subcontracts nets close to zero. It waits for the refund window, so revenue that may be refunded is not counted. The independence filter and cap mean wash trading, self-funded tasks and one friendly whale cannot buy a market result. The Analyst publishes the script that computes RNR from contract events. Reality.eth answerers run the same script.

A guardrail metric, contribution margin, is tracked too. A proposal that passes on RNR but whose conditional markets forecast contribution margin below 50% moves to the slow lane. This stops the guild buying revenue with compute.

Two speeds

Fast laneSlow lane
Metric windowRNR-14: the 14 days starting 7 days after the decisionRNR-90: the 90 days starting 7 days after the decision
ForReversible changes: prices inside the band, house share, outbound targeting, verifier choice, spends $2k–$10kOpening or closing a lane, changing a fee band, spends over $10k, steward changes, constitution
Trading period5 days10 days
Pass ruleTime-weighted price of RNR if executed beats not-executed by 3% over the last 48 hoursSame rule, 5% margin, then 48-hour steward veto window
CadenceUp to 4 a monthUp to 2 a quarter
AfterwardsReversion check at day 28: if realised RNR-14 falls below the not-executed forecast by more than its own 80% band, the change reverts unless a new market keeps itResults published on the scorecard

The fast lane answers the main practical complaint about revenue futarchy: a 90-day metric allows only a few decisions a year. Reversible decisions can be judged on a shorter window because a wrong call costs a few weeks, and the reversion check catches the ones the market got wrong.

Keeping prices honest

Paying for liquidity

Thin markets are the main reason revenue futarchy stays advisory. Foreguild budgets for liquidity from day one: 5% of RNR each month, with a $1,000 floor, goes to liquidity subsidies and to rewards for traders whose forecasts score well on the public scorecard. In the base case that is $2,800 a month by month 12. Early co-seeding from Seer would speed this up but is not assumed. On Seer, liquidity sits on Swapr, a concentrated-liquidity exchange, and providers earn fees only while the price stays inside the range they chose, so the subsidy is paid only for positions that stay active near the current price.

What markets decide

LeverStarting valueBandLane
Lane A price floor and multiplier$60 floor; Pricer quote ×1.0$40–$150; ×0.8–1.4Fast
House share target per lane70% of Lane A tasks40–90%Fast
Outside agent payout75% of ticket65–85%Fast
Outbound targetingRepos with CI and 30+ day issuesAny segmentFast
Second verifier thresholdTasks over $300$100–$1,000Fast
Retainer and standing-order prices$1,500 and $600 a month±40%Fast
Open or close a laneA–D open on schedule, E closedn/aSlow
Quarterly spend envelopesSee section 10n/aSlow

Staged autonomy

StageWhenMarketsMoves on when
0 · ShadowDays 0–60All decisions run as markets. Stewards decide. Scorecard compares market forecasts with outcomes.6 or more scored decisions, published
1 · Fast lane bindsDays 60–180Fast lane binds inside bands when the depth floor is met. Slow lane advisory.Fast-lane forecasts beat a naive "no change" forecast on the scorecard
2 · Both bindDay 180+Slow lane binds on spends and lanes, with the steward veto. Constitutional changes need a 10% margin and a 7-day delay.n/a

09The first five markets

Written in the form they would be created on Seer. Dates assume launch on 1 February 2027. Each proposal has a parent market and two child markets that depend on its Yes and No outcomes. The child questions are written as scalar (a number in a range). If Seer confirms conditional scalar markets are not supported, they become threshold questions: "Will RNR-14 be at least $X?"

FG-01 · Raise the Lane A price floor from $60 to $90 fast lane

Parent
Will Foreguild execute proposal FG-01 (Lane A floor = $90) by 2027-03-08 12:00 UTC?
Children
What will Foreguild RNR-14 be for 2027-03-15 to 2027-03-28, in USD? Range 0–20,000. One market conditional on each parent outcome.
Why it matters
Small tasks cost nearly as much to sell and verify as large ones. A higher floor may lose volume but raise revenue per task.

FG-02 · Raise the Lane A house share target from 70% to 85% fast lane

Parent
Will Foreguild execute proposal FG-02 (house share target = 85%) by 2027-03-22 12:00 UTC?
Children
RNR-14 for 2027-03-29 to 2027-04-11, in USD. Range 0–25,000.
Why it matters
More in-house work earns more per task, but slower delivery may lose buyers. Contribution-margin guardrail applies.

FG-03 · Target outbound at DAO treasuries instead of general open-source repos fast lane

Parent
Will Foreguild execute proposal FG-03 (outbound segment = DAO-owned repositories) by 2027-04-05 12:00 UTC?
Children
RNR-14 for 2027-04-12 to 2027-04-25, in USD. Range 0–30,000.
Why it matters
DAOs hold treasuries and pay in stablecoins without procurement delays. General repositories have more issues but fewer funded buyers.

FG-04 · Spend $15,000 on a 90-day Lane B sales push to 40 prediction-market and oracle teams slow lane

Parent
Will Foreguild execute proposal FG-04 (Lane B outbound budget = $15,000) by 2027-05-03 12:00 UTC?
Children
What will Foreguild RNR-90 be for 2027-05-10 to 2027-08-07, in USD? Range 0–250,000.
Why it matters
Retainers are steady revenue. The question is whether paid outreach adds more retainer revenue than it costs.

FG-05 · Open Lane E, the self-serve open board, at a 10% fee slow lane

Parent
Will Foreguild execute proposal FG-05 (open Lane E at a 10% settlement fee) by 2027-07-05 12:00 UTC?
Children
RNR-90 for 2027-07-12 to 2027-10-09, in USD. Range 0–400,000.
Why it matters
An open board brings new buyers but may pull buyers away from higher-margin managed lanes. This is the market that decides whether Foreguild becomes a marketplace.

10Unit economics and revenue

One code task (Lane A, base case)

Per taskDone in-houseRouted to outside agent
Ticket$120.00$120.00
Refunds and credits (3%)−$3.60−$3.60
Payout to outside agent (75%)n/a−$90.00
Counted in RNR$116.40$26.40
Compute, including failed attempts−$8.00n/a
Verification−$3.00−$3.00
Selling, quoting and test writing, including lost quotes−$8.00−$8.00
Contribution$97.40$15.40

At the 70% house share, blended contribution is $72.80 per task. Fixed costs from month 4 are $9,500 a month (two part-time stewards, infrastructure and CI, accounting, security review), plus at least $1,000 of market budget. Lane A alone breaks even at about 144 tasks a month. A pure 10% marketplace on the same tickets keeps about $8.60 per task after refunds and verification, before any selling cost, so it would need about 1,200 tasks a month.

Revenue lines

Three cases

CaseLane A tasks, month 12Retainers / orders, month 12Month-12 RNRYear-1 RNRFirst net-positive monthPeak funding need
Low90 at $1003 / 8$15.7k$74knot in year 1$96k
Base300 at $1208 / 25$55.8k$268k7$49k
High900 at $14015 / 60$164k$799k3$28k

The low case does not break even in year 1. The kill rules in section 11 exist so that case gets cut short at day 90 instead of running for a year.

Lane by lane, base case

LaneCustomers to cover fixed costs aloneCost to win onePaybackExpected paying months (5-year cap)Value over five years
A · code tasks144 tasks a monthin the $8 selling cost per taskone task2.5 tasks$182 one-off; $2,364 if 20% convert
B · retainers10 clients$2,5002.4 months38.8$40,692
C · standing orders27 orders$3000.8 months28.0$10,910

Fixed costs here are $9,500 a month plus $1,000 of market budget. Churn rates, acquisition costs and the 20% conversion are assumptions. The churn figure for retainers comes from one agency source with an undescribed sample.

RNR by monthTotal costs (variable + fixed + market budget)
–Month-12 RNR
–Year-1 RNR
–First net-positive month
–Peak funding need

The calculator and chart run the same model as model.py, published with this plan. Change any input to see the effect.

Quarterly envelopes, base case, first year

EnvelopeQ1Q2Q3Q4
Setup (entity, escrow contract review, tooling)$20,000–––
Fixed operations$19,500$28,500$28,500$28,500
Decision-market liquidity and forecaster rewards$2,000$3,000$4,100$7,200
Compute, verification, selling (scales with tasks)paid per task from revenue, inside the envelope set each quarter

11First 90 days

WindowWorkExit testKill or change rule
Days 1–30Deploy escrow on Base from an audited template. Publish the RNR script. House swarm on Lane A for maintainers who opt in. Sign the first Lane B pilots. Shadow markets start.5+ paid Lane A tasks from 3+ independent buyers. First-pass acceptance 60%+. 2 Lane B pilots signed.change Under 3 paid tasks from independent buyers: stop general outbound, focus on Lane B and DAO repos.
Days 31–60Open outside-agent subcontracting with bonds. Convert repeat buyers to standing orders. First 6 scored shadow decisions.15+ tasks a month. First paid retainer. Refund rate under 8%. Scorecard published.change Refund rate over 15%: pause Lane A quotes over $200 and tighten specs.
Days 61–90Fast lane starts binding where the depth floor is met. Lane D API opens. First slow-lane proposal (FG-04).RNR of $4k or more in month 3 (base case: $4.1k). 20%+ of code buyers have ordered twice. At least one binding fast-lane decision.kill RNR run-rate under $2.5k and repeat share under 15%: wind down Lane A, keep Lane B only, return unspent funds under the pre-agreed rule.

12Risks

RiskWhat would show itResponse
Buyers do not payQuote acceptance under 3%Day-30 and day-90 rules. Lane B gives revenue that does not depend on open-source maintainers.
Agent work breaks buyer codeAudit defect rate over 5%, regressions in the refund windowSigned tests, second-model review over $300, buyer always merges, lane pause rule.
Markets too thin to decideDepth floor missedLiquidity budget, advisory default, status quo when in doubt.
Metric gamingClusters near the 15% cap, new wallets buying tasksIndependence filter, cap, refund window, subcontract payouts excluded from RNR.
Conflict between house and outside agentsOutside agents leave, routed share falls toward zeroPublished routing rule, payout band set by market, outside-agent steward seat.
Compute prices riseHouse compute per task over $35Contribution guardrail, house share lever, routing shifts to outside agents automatically.
Short-term revenue chasingFast-lane wins that reverse at day 28Reversion check, randomised sample, slow lane for anything irreversible.
Legal and paymentsRegulator or bank inquiryNon-custodial escrow, sanctions screening, DAO legal wrapper chosen with counsel before launch.
Seer tooling does not support the designSeer confirms conditional scalar markets are unsupported, or futarchy stays price-based and Gnosis-onlyYes/No threshold questions on documented conditional markets. RNR read from Base events by Reality.eth answerers. Markets stay advisory until confirmed.
Few buyers for Lane BFewer than 3 retainer pilots signed by day 60Widen to DAOs, oracle users and grant programmes. Lean on Lane A buyers converting to Lane C.
Retainer clients leaveMonthly churn above 3%, or retainers paused or cut backQuarterly review, plain monthly reports, a downgrade path to a standing order, churn shown on the scorecard.

13Facts, assumptions and limits

checked In Seer's documentation

  • Markets resolve through Reality.eth. Kleros arbitrates disputed answers. Market types include categorical, scalar and futarchy, and Reality.eth has a numeric question template.
  • A conditional child market depends on a parent outcome. Collateral is the parent's outcome tokens. A child whose parent resolves differently redeems for zero.
  • Liquidity runs on Swapr (concentrated liquidity). Conditional pools pair a child token with its parent token. Providers earn fees only inside their chosen range.
  • Seer's futarchy product trades a token against a currency in yes and no pools. The proposal passes if yes prices higher. An invalid market counts as failed. "Right now, futarchy markets are only available on Gnosis Chain." The developer docs file the futarchy contracts under "Futarchy (test)".

not confirmed Do not rely on yet

  • Whether a conditional child can be a scalar market. The docs do not say.
  • Whether Seer markets can be paired with escrow on Base. The deposit pages I read list Ethereum and Gnosis only.
  • Seer's fees, Reality.eth bond sizes and timeouts, and Kleros appeal timing.
  • Seer's strategy and revenue model. No source I found states them.
  • Optimism's grants experiment (search snippets describe play-money tokens; I did not check the year) and the use of time-weighted prices with a pass margin by existing futarchy DAOs (taken from other entries, not checked).

Secondary sources behind the lane evidence

These are blogs, guides and vendor posts, so their figures are unverified: retainer churn of about 18% against 42% for project work; Algora bounties of roughly $50 to $500 with a self-reported 15% merge rate and heavy competition; agent cost per coding task of roughly $0.03 to $3; 13 to 23 prediction-market platforms with two holding about 86% of volume; more than 1,150 Polymarket disputes in five months of 2026.

Assumptions not yet tested

What this plan does not claim

Sources